I. THE ENVIRONMENT
The economic environment consists of an upstream party, a downstream party, and an asset.
In each period of a repeated game, the upstream party uses the asset to produce a good (which lasts for that period only). If the upstream party owns the asset then we call the transaction nonintegrated (the upstream party is an independent contractor, working with an asset she owns), whereas if the downstream party owns the asset then we call the transaction integrated (the upstream party is an employee, working with an asset owned by the firm).
We analyze two sources of incentives in spot markets: formal (i.e., solely reliant on courtenforceable contracts) and informal (i.e., involving non-contractual mechanisms such as bargaining or hold-up). To do so, we assume that the transaction includes both contractible and noncontractible components. The non-contractible component of the good is modeled as in Baker, 1 Early repeated-game models of relational contracts include Benjamin Klein and Keith Leffler (1981) , Clive Bull (1987) , and Bentley MacLeod and James Malcomson (1989) . Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) study the interaction between court-enforceable and relational contracts; Maija Halonen (1994) , Gerald Garvey (1995) , and Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2001) study the interaction between asset ownership and relational contracts. Gibbons, and Murphy (2001) [hereafter BGM]: (1) it has value Q to the downstream party but also has value P in an alternative use; (2) the asset is specific, in the sense that Q>P; and (3) Q and P are not contractible but are observable to the upstream and downstream parties and so can be the basis of a relational contract in a repeated game. To add the contractible component of the good to the model, we assume that the good has characteristics X that are contractible and so can be the basis of a court-enforceable contract w(X) even in a one-shot transaction.
It would be natural to assume that the good's contractible characteristics have some value to the downstream party, and perhaps also some value in an alternative use. For simplicity in this short paper, however, we assume that these characteristics have no value in and of themselves, to the downstream party or anyone else. Thus, the parties' only interest in the contractible component of the good is that the actions taken to achieve X may also affect the likelihoods of Q and P (and/or the costs of other actions that affect these likelihoods), as follows. Each period, the upstream party chooses a vector of actions a=(a 1 ,a 2 ,...,a N ) that stochastically affect Q, P, and X. These actions cost the upstream party c(a). Given the actions, Q, P, and X are conditionally independent. The possible values of Q, P, and X are finite: Q∈{Q 1 ,…,Q K }, P∈{P 1 ,…,P J }, and X∈{X 1 ,…,X M }.
Given this framework, we can formalize the idea that Q and P are not contractible: there is no function g(•) mapping {X 1 ,…,X M } into {Q 1 ,…,Q K } such that the conditional distribution of g(X)
given a is identical to the conditional distribution of Q given a, and likewise for P. Because we use the Nash bargaining solution below, it will also be important that for some fixed value of α, αQ+(1-α)P is not contractible, defined in the analogous way.
In addition to describing the contractibility of X, Q, P, and αQ+(1-α)P, we must also specify the contractibility of trade. We assume that ownership of the asset conveys ownership of (both components of) the good produced using the asset. But we also assume that trade in the contractible component is contractible, whereas trade in the non-contractible component is not contractible. For example, if the downstream party owns the asset then he could simply take both components of the good, paying only the contractible fee w(X) but refusing to pay the upstream party anything further.
Alternatively, if the upstream party owns the asset then she could collect the contractible fee w(X) but deliver only the contractible component, threatening to consign the non-contractible component of the good to its alternative use. Note that we use the same notation w(X) to mean slightly different contracts in these two cases: if downstream owns the asset then w(X) is simply an agency contract specifying payment w for results X; if upstream owns the asset then w(X) is the payment specified if upstream transfers ownership of a contractible component with characteristics X.
As quick examples of our two-component framework, consider R&D, software development, and consulting. In such settings, an outside expert may be hired to conduct a project for a client. If the expert meets the specifications written in the contract then the expert must be paid. But suppose that in meeting the contract specifications the expert also develops an unanticipated by-product that would be valuable to the client.
2 If this by-product is not covered in the original contract then the outside expert is free not to sell it to the client, and may be free to sell it to other users. If the expert were an internal employee, on the other hand, then the client would own everything produced by the expert, whether covered in the original contract or not.
We find our two-component model both theoretically compelling and empirically relevant.
Regarding theory, something of this kind is necessary in order to blend court-enforceable contracts with asset ownership. That is, under non-integration the upstream party must be able to withhold something from the downstream party or the GHM-style ex post bargaining will not occur. And empirically, if one believes that such ex post bargaining is a real feature of non-integrated transactions, even in the presence of incomplete court-enforceable contracts, then one is forced towards something like our framework.
II. SPOT OUTSOURCING AND SPOT EMPLOYMENT
In this section we analyze the static version of our model. Consistent with common usage, we call the integrated case "employment," and the non-integrated case "outsourcing."
A. Spot Employment
Under spot employment the downstream party owns the asset but there is no relational contract. This case is a multi-task agency problem, similar to Holmstrom-Milgrom (1991) . In the terminology introduced above, the only incentives in this case are formal.
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Because the downstream party owns the asset, he can simply take both components of the good while paying the upstream party only the contractible payment w(X). The upstream party therefore will choose actions a
where X(a) denotes the random variable X given a (and likewise for Q(a) and P(a) below). The 
B. Spot Outsourcing
Under spot outsourcing the upstream party owns the asset but there is no relational contract.
This case involves ex post bargaining, similar to non-integration in a GHM model, but adds the possibility of court-enforceable contracts. Incentives in this case are thus both formal and informal.
Because the upstream party owns the asset, she can collect the contractible fee w(X) but deliver only the contractible component of the good, threatening to consign the non-contractible component to its alternative use. Although upstream and downstream cannot contract on the realized values of Q and P, they can negotiate ex post over the price of the non-contractible component. We use the Nash bargaining solution (with bargaining power α for the upstream party) to arrive at this price: downstream will pay upstream the alternative-use value, P, plus 0<α<1 of the surplus from use by the downstream party, Q -P, so the price is αQ+(1-α)P. 
C. Coasean Comparisons
In the spirit of HMT, it is easy to construct examples in which spot employment is more efficient than spot outsourcing (S SE > S SO ) because integration eliminates market incentives. For instance, imagine that X = a 1 , Q = a 1 + ka 2 , and P = a 3 , where k is sufficiently small. Then under non-integration the upstream party will pursue the socially wasteful activity a 3 , whereas under integration there will be contractual incentives for a 1 only. For k sufficiently small, the omission of incentives for a 2 under integration is preferable to the inclusion of incentives for a 3 under nonintegration. In this case it would clearly be undesirable to replicate the market inside the firm.
In the spirit of GHM, it is easy to construct examples in which spot outsourcing is more efficient than spot employment (S SE < S SO ) because the market provides useful informal incentives via ex post bargaining. For instance, imagine that X = a 1 , Q = a 1 + a 2 , and P = a 2 . Then under integration there will be contractual incentives for a 1 but no incentives for a 2 , whereas nonintegration can achieve the first best: the upstream party will have incentives to pursue both a 2 (anticipating bargaining) and a 1 (because of bargaining and a contract).
To launch the remainder of the paper, imagine that the initial economic environment was such that spot employment was more efficient than spot outsourcing, but that the parameters changed (permanently) so that spot outsourcing became more efficient. If there is a cost of dissolving the initial integrated firm then that firm would like to replicate the spot market without dissolving.
Obviously, the firm cannot use only a formal contract w(X) to mimic the partially informal payoffs w SO (X) + αQ+(1-α)P. But one might think that a firm could replicate the spot market's noncontractible payoffs via a relational contract. We turn next to this issue.
III. RELATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
In relational employment, as in spot employment, the downstream party owns the asset and there can be a formal contract w(X). But in relational employment there can also be a relational contract based on the realizations Q, P, and X. Such relational employment contracts can provide informal upstream incentives, provided that the parties value their reputations sufficiently. The core of our analysis is therefore checking whether reputation concerns outweigh the temptation to renege on a given relational employment contract.
after either party reneges, after which the upstream and downstream parties will earn U SO and D SO , respectively. For the downstream party, the present value of honoring the contract is -b(Q,P,X) + 1 r D RE , so he will honor rather than renege on the relational contract when
Similarly, the upstream party will honor rather than renege on the relational contract when
If (1) holds for all b(Q,P,X) then it must hold for the largest b(Q,P,X), while if (2) holds for all b(Q,P,X) then it must hold for the smallest b(Q,P,X). Combining these two extreme versions of (1) and (2) Combing (3) and (4) yields a single necessary condition for a self-enforcing relational contract, The proof of our proposition follows from inspection of (5). If the firm offers (w(•),b(•)) satisfying w(X) + b(Q,P,X) =w S0 (X) + αQ+(1-α)P then the upstream party's actions will be identical to those in spot outsourcing, thus generating surplus S RE = S S0 . But αQ+(1-α)P is noncontractible so b(Q,P,X) cannot be constant. Thus, the left-hand side of (5) ). In short, replicating the spot market generates too little surplus to overcome its own reneging temptations.
IV. DISCUSSION
Our result that informal spot-market outcomes cannot be replicated within firms is a cautionary tale for those who would "bring the market inside the firm" via transfer pricing, performance measurement (such as "Economic Value Added"), empowerment, and the like. Lest this result seem too gloomy, however, note that it may still be possible for relational employment to improve on both spot alternatives, even if it cannot mimic spot outsourcing. For example, imagine that X = a 1 , Q = a 1 + ka 2 , and P = a 2 . Spot employment will then use the formal contract w(X) to provide incentives for a 1 but not for a 2 . Spot outsourcing will be more efficient than spot employment, providing incentives for a 1 through a formal contract and informal incentives for a 1 and a 2 through the bargained payoff αQ+(1-α)P. But if k>1 then incentives for a 2 will be too low even in spot outsourcing; as a result, for sufficiently small r, a relational employment contract can increase incentives for a 2 and so dominate both spot employment and spot outsourcing.
This example illustrates what Oliver Williamson (1985) calls "selective intervention:"
replicating the useful features of market governance but intervening when necessary to avoid the market's inefficiencies. Williamson correctly argues that such selective intervention is not always possible (else we would observe only one enormous firm). This example shows that selective intervention can sometimes work, because firms use relational contracts not merely to replicate the informal incentives in markets, but to generate better incentives and higher surplus than could be generated in either spot outsourcing or spot employment.
It is natural for economists to be enamored with markets and skeptical of bureaucracies, so efforts to make internal transactions more market-like are understandable. But the evidence is overwhelming that horizontal and vertical transactions inside large organizations are typically quite unlike spot-market transactions. In particular, internal transactions often rely heavily on relational contracts. This paper and BGM are motivated by and consistent with this evidence: relational contracts are very important inside firms, not because they replicate spot-market payoffs, but because they allow firms to improve on market outcomes.
